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ABSTRACT 
  The Free Exercise Clause was enacted for the purpose of protecting 
diverse modes of religious practice. One practice that numerous 
religious traditions observe is shunning—the expulsion and social 
exclusion of noncompliant individuals from a religious community. 
Yet because shunning usually involves concomitant harm to religious 
congregants, plaintiffs often bring religious-tort claims against religious 
entities for the injuries they suffer. This implicates free-exercise 
concerns for both the plaintiff and the religious-entity defendant. 
Despite the utmost importance of religious freedom in American 
jurisprudence, courts analyze religious-tort claims in widely disparate 
ways. And they typically rely on consent and membership as the basis 
for judicial decisionmaking.  
  But these analytical lenses are flimsy and lead to unpredictable 
outcomes. At times, they are underprotective of religious plaintiffs; at 
others, they penalize religious entities and chill religious practices. In 
order to clarify a muddled sphere of free-exercise jurisprudence, courts 
should adopt a contract paradigm for analyzing shunning claims. A 
contract paradigm would lead to cleaner results and would uphold the 
integrity of religious institutions, which are necessary for religious 
individuals to thrive. 
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“If anyone has caused grief, he has not so much grieved 
me as he has grieved all of you. The punishment inflicted 
on him by the majority is sufficient.”1 
“And this I believe: that the free, exploring mind of the 
individual human is the most valuable thing in the 
world. And this I would fight for: the freedom of the 
mind to take any direction it wishes, undirected. And this 
I must fight against: any idea, religion, or government 
which limits or destroys the individual.”2 
INTRODUCTION 
John Donne incisively remarked: “No man is an island, entire of 
itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main. If a clod 
be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less.”3 A question that jurists 
have grappled with for centuries is what recourse should be granted in 
tort, if any, when religious communities force their members to become 
islands through their disciplinary practices.4 The human is a social 
animal5 and, as such, social exclusion can have traumatic 
consequences—psychological, economic, spiritual, and even physical.6  
 
 1. 2 Corinthians 2:5–6. 
 2. JOHN STEINBECK, EAST OF EDEN 131 (Penguin Books 2002) (1952). 
 3. JOHN DONNE, DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS 89 (Anthony Raspa ed., 
Oxford University Press, 1st ed. 1987). 
 4. These practices include, but are not limited to, excommunication, shunning, and 
disfellowshipping. This Note will use the term “shunning” as an umbrella term. Although there 
are various permutations of shunning, it often involves the removal of social, sacramental, or 
ritual contact from the shunned person. For example, in Jehovah’s Witness and Amish 
communities, shunning “involves the complete withdrawal of social, spiritual, and economic 
contact from a member or former member of a religious group. The shunned person can lose, 
among other things, her spouse, children, business, and standing in the community.” Justin K. 
Miller, Comment, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: Religious Shunning and the Free 
Exercise Clause, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 272–73 (1988); see also Wollersheim v. Church of 
Scientology of Cal., 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 6 (Ct. App. 1989), vacated, 499 U.S. 914 (1991) (detailing 
the disciplinary methods of the Church of Scientology toward former members). 
 5. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 59–61 (Betty Radice ed., Trevor J. Saunders trans., Penguin 
Books rev. ed. 1981) (n.d.). 
 6. See Baugh v. Thomas, 265 A.2d 675, 677 (N.J. 1970) (“We believe that expulsion from a 
church or other religious organization can constitute a serious emotional deprivation which, when 
compared to some losses of property or contract rights, can be far more damaging to an 
individual.”); E.M. Seidel et al., The Impact of Social Exclusion vs. Inclusion on Subjective and 
Hormonal Reactions in Females and Males, PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 2925, 2926–27 
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These consequences are particularly acute for those subjected to 
religious disciplinary practices like shunning.  
For millennia, shunning has served as a forceful tool through 
which religious communities advance their goals.7 Although diverse in 
expression and application, shunning often involves the expulsion of a 
member from her religious community, followed by the concomitant 
practices set in motion by the expulsion.8 Yet many courts refrain from 
granting excommunicants redress in tort, even amid serious allegations 
of abuse.9 Unfortunate as this may seem, various constitutional 
considerations constrain a secular court’s discretion to award damages 
caused by religious discipline.  
Chief among these considerations is the Free Exercise Clause. 
Many courts understandably fear that tort liability will chill 
longstanding religious practices. However, courts advance wildly 
disparate applications of free-exercise principles to shunning cases.  
Some favor the state’s interest in granting claimants recourse in tort;10 
 
(2013) (discussing the physical and psychological effects of social exclusion and drawing attention 
to the disparate impact such exclusion can have on males and females).  
 7. These goals include the desire to keep a religious community pure, the desire to bring a 
sinner to repentance, the desire to uphold certain truth claims, and even the desire for retribution. 
See, e.g., Michael J. Broyde, Forming Religious Communities and Respecting Dissenter’s Rights: 
A Jewish Tradition for a Modern Society, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES 203, 209–14 (John Witte, Jr. & Johan D. van der Vyver 
eds., 1996) (noting that one purpose of Jewish exclusion, among others, is to “deter future 
violations of Jewish law—primarily by other members of society, but also by the excluded 
person”). This highlights the bilateral goals often present in shunning, which is intended to benefit 
both the community and the religious dissident. See Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 
P.2d 766, 795 (Okla. 1989) (Hodges, J., dissenting) (noting that the “twofold purpose[s] of the 
Church[’s] disciplinary practice” are “(1) to cause a disobedient member to miss the fellowship 
and to desire to repent, and (2) to purify the church and to prevent the sin from spreading, thus, 
operating as a deterrent to other members from committing the same sin” (citation omitted)). 
 8. See text accompanying supra note 4. 
 9. See, e.g., Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. 2008) 
(denying recovery on free-exercise grounds when church members had forcibly held teenage 
plaintiff’s arms down for long periods of time despite her demands to be freed during an 
exorcism). 
 10. See, e.g., Guinn, 775 P.2d at 786 (holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not bar 
recovery for a church’s disciplinary actions taken after a former congregant had withdrawn her 
membership); Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 341 A.2d 105, 107 (Pa. 1975) (noting that 
the shunning practice “may be an excessive interference within areas of ‘paramount state 
concern,’ i.e. the maintenance of marriage and family relationship, alienation of affection, and the 
tortious interference with a business relationship” that “the courts of this Commonwealth may 
have authority to regulate, even in light of the ‘Establishment’ and ‘Free Exercise’ clauses of the 
First Amendment” (emphasis in original)). 
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others remain agnostic under the First Amendment’s shadow.11 So it is 
difficult to extrapolate guiding principles from case law. Neither has 
the scholarly literature on religious shunning provided much 
direction.12 This dearth of careful discourse is glaring in light of the 
volume of religious-discipline cases and the importance of free-
exercise values. This Note therefore addresses some of the most 
pressing legal issues that shunning practices raise and proposes an 
analytical framework to aid courts in their resolution.  
When resolving claims arising from religious discipline, courts and 
commentators typically rely on concepts like membership status and ex 
post consent. With membership, for example, courts look to a 
claimant’s membership status to determine if her religious affiliation 
subjected her to the religious entity’s judicature.13 Under a consent 
framework, by contrast, courts merely examine whether a person 
consented to the community’s disciplinary measures in order to 
determine if those measures were actionable.14 Courts should avoid 
nebulous categories like these. Not only do they render muddled legal 
analyses, but more importantly, they fail to strike the appropriate 
balance between individual and organizational free-exercise rights. 
 
 11. See, e.g., Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 883–84 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (abstaining from reaching the merits of plaintiff’s tort claim under the Free Exercise 
Clause). 
 12. Student notes provide the most thorough treatment of this topic, and many were written 
over fifteen years ago. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 4, at 271; Nicholas Merkin, Note, Getting Rid 
of Sinners May Be Expensive: A Suggested Approach to Torts Related to Religious Shunning 
Under the Free Exercise Clause, 34 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 369, 397 (2001). Shunning has also 
received passing and episodic attention from a handful of legal scholars, also over fifteen years 
ago. See, e.g., Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated “Outrageous” Conduct: Intentional Infliction 
of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against “Other People’s Faiths,” 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 579 
(1993) (proposing a consent theory for religious cases involving claims for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress); Daryl L. Wiesen, Following the Lead of Defamation: A Definitional 
Balancing Approach to Religious Torts, 105 YALE L.J. 291, 301–03 (1995) (discussing religious 
shunning as a subset of religious torts). Professors Wiesen and Hayden only include shunning as 
a tangential aspect of their overall theses, however.  
 13. See, e.g., infra notes 79–86 and accompanying text. The term “judicature,” as courts have 
employed it, is vague and obscures the overall analysis. Compare Guinn, 775 P.2d at 773–83 
(noting that church practices are not immune from “secular judicature”) with Hadnot v. Shaw, 
826 P.2d 978, 987–90 (Okla. 1992) (using the term “judicature” to describe the church’s 
disciplinary practice). From what can be surmised, it means something like “jurisdictional 
authority to punish” or “ecclesiastical jurisdiction.” This Note will replace “judicature” with 
“jurisdiction” or “disciplinary authority” when possible, as these will be more idiomatic and 
produce similar, albeit clearer, meanings. However, “judicature” will necessarily be employed in 
light of its prevalence in shunning law. 
 14. See, e.g., infra notes 96–98. 
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Religious practices find meaning in, and are therefore worth 
protecting for, religious communities and traditions. In the most 
problematic applications of consent and membership, courts penalize 
communal religious practices for the sake of individual dissenters who 
assumed the risk of harm. In the most thoughtful applications of 
consent and membership, religious communities are left uncertain 
about civil penalties altogether, which thereby chills religious customs 
of enduring importance. Because religious institutions are essential to 
the flourishing of the free exercise of religion, both results are 
repugnant to the Free Exercise Clause. Consent and membership, 
therefore, fail to afford religious communities the protection that the 
First Amendment demands. 
Reliance upon consent and membership can also fail to protect 
individuals where protection might otherwise be warranted. These 
frameworks encourage mechanical application when the dynamics of 
congregations and excommunicants are anything but mechanical. The 
more dispositive membership and consent become, the greater the risk 
of overlooking factual nuance—for example, whether a congregant 
abused her membership to contravene the law or undermine public 
policy. Such cases may be infrequent, but they are no less important for 
courts to get right. 
A contract paradigm more aptly resolves shunning cases because 
it strikes the right balance between individual and organizational 
rights. Under a contract template, courts would look to contract 
principles to determine if the requisite informed consent to church 
discipline was exhibited at the outset of a parish-parishioner 
relationship. If so, then courts would hold religious participants and 
communities to the express and implied terms of their covenants, 
regardless of ongoing consent or membership status. If a valid contract 
never formed, then the appropriate remedy might very well be tort 
liability. And if a parishioner breaches an implied covenant, then 
religious discipline might be warranted. This is not to suggest that a 
contract paradigm would solve all of the legal issues presented by 
religious shunning. However, a contract framework is better suited to 
address religious-discipline cases than the prevailing frameworks.  
Such an approach would not involve inquest into religious 
doctrines and practices, as some might fear.15 Nor would it cause courts 
 
 15. For scholarship expressing concern over judicial inquest into religious doctrines, see 
James D. Gordon, Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion: A Subjective Alternative, 102 HARV. 
L. REV. 1258, 1262 (1989) (highlighting instances of judicial inquest into religious sincerity); 
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to become bogged down by questions concerning whether a 
parishioner consented to a church’s shunning practices as an ongoing 
matter. Instead, a contract framework would invite courts to examine 
a parish-parishioner agreement to determine what sort of risk a 
parishioner might have assumed through her participation in the life of 
the parish. Thus, by placing the locus of judicial analysis on ex ante 
manifestations of consent, a contract paradigm prevents excessive 
focus on peripheral issues and facilitates more principled 
decisionmaking.  
More importantly, a contract framework would protect the 
integrity of religious institutions. It would do this by granting wider 
latitude to religious entities and allowing them to predict how courts 
will adjudicate their practices. This does not subordinate the 
individual’s free-exercise rights; rather, it tempers them to comport 
with the free-exercise values that animated the First Amendment’s 
enactment. By treating the individual and community as equals ex ante, 
individual liberties are kept from trumping institutional liberties. At 
the same time, protecting institutional rights in fact enables the 
individual exercise of religion. Thus, contract principles strike a more 
appropriate balance between congregants and congregations.  
This Note therefore critiques current iterations of shunning 
jurisprudence and advances a contract paradigm for the resolution of 
shunning cases. To this end, it proceeds in three Parts. Part I sketches 
the doctrinal underpinnings of shunning jurisprudence, tracing its 
development and shedding light on its difficulties. Part II uses this 
account to frame the issues presented in two paradigmatic religious-
tort cases—Westbrook v. Penley16 and Hadnot v. Shaw.17 These cases, 
decided by sister state supreme courts, illustrate the shortcomings of 
the prevailing analytical frameworks—membership and consent—in 
the modern era. Finally, Part III synthesizes these cases and argues that 
applying a contract template to religious-tort claims would yield more 
coherent results and reduce tension among First Amendment values. 
 
Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt From Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. REV. 
781, 828 (2007) (arguing that inquests that “draw government actors into assessments of religious 
tenets” inhibit religious liberty). 
 16. Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007). 
 17. Hadnot v. Shaw, 826 P.2d 978 (Okla. 1992). 
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I.  LEGAL BACKGROUND: FIRST FORAYS INTO SHUNNING 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Given the harm that shunning inflicts upon a congregant,18 a clash 
of state common law and free-exercise jurisprudence often results: 
Victims sue religious groups for their shunning practices, and religious 
groups seek refuge from state intrusion under constitutional shelter. 
Yet courts vary widely in how far to extend this shelter, and religious-
tort decisions are heavily driven by their factual intricacies.19 Thus, in 
the “eternal youth” of the common law,20 ad hoc First Amendment 
judgments will only continue to perpetuate unpredictability in an area 
of great constitutional import. Before delving into shunning 
jurisprudence, however, the free-exercise origins that led to this 
confusion must be traced. 
A. Free-Exercise Jurisprudence: An Arc Toward Heightened 
Protection 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”21 The Free Exercise 
Clause’s language is capacious and First Amendment jurisprudence 
has often been forced to toe the line between ensuring religious liberty 
on the one hand and abstaining from religious establishment on the 
 
 18. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 19. See Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701, 701–02 (1986) 
(“Contemporary constitutional law just does not know how to handle problems of religion.”). See 
John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the 
Constitution, 72 CAL. L. REV. 847, 848 (1984) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
on the religion clauses has become “obscured by the incantation of verbal formulae devoid of 
explanatory value”).  
 20. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 
(1890) (discussing the evolutionary and accretive nature of common-law doctrine amid shifting 
“[p]olitical, social, and economic” climates). 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. I. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause was first applied to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See id. at 303 (“The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] 
Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.” (citation omitted)). 
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other.22 As Lemon v. Kurtzman23 tersely summarizes, the religion 
clauses are designed to “prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of 
either [religion or government] into the precincts of the other.”24   
Early attempts to address government interference with religion 
distinguished between belief and action in order to allow the 
government to restrict religious behavior it disfavored.25 For powerful 
reasons,26 however, this dichotomy proved to be misplaced and 
unworkable, and courts ultimately jettisoned the belief-action 
doctrine.27 Along the way, courts articulated principles that expanded 
the ambit of the Free Exercise Clause, bridling it only when the 
 
 22. See, e.g., David E. Fitzkee & Linell A. Letendre, Religion in the Military: Navigating the 
Channel between the Religion Clauses, 59 A.F. L. REV. 1, 72 (2007) (discussing this dual concern 
in the military context and observing that “military attorneys wrestle with a complex array of 
constitutional tests . . . to navigate the narrow channel between the free exercise of religion by 
military members and establishment of religion by the military . . . a feat compared to navigating 
the narrow channel between the Scylla and Charybdis in Greek mythology”). Additionally, the 
Constitution protects the free-exercise interests of both religious institutions and individuals, 
making this area of constitutional law rife with conflicting interests and challenges. See, e.g., 
Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 790 (Okla. 1989) (Wilson, J., dissenting in 
part and concurring in part) (discussing the competing free-exercise interests of religious 
organizations and individuals). 
 23. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 24. Id. at 614.  
 25. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164–66 (1878) (“Congress was deprived 
of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions . . . . Laws are made 
for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and 
opinions, they may with practices.”). The Court used this logic to uphold the criminality of 
polygamy. Id. at 168. The issue, of course, is that the First Amendment is devoid of a “free belief” 
clause. 
 26. See Harrop A. Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 806, 818 
(1958) (asserting that the Framers’ intent was not for the government to exercise unbridled 
authority over conduct while merely leaving beliefs intact); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Tiers 
for the Establishment Clause, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 85 (2017) (“[T]he government has powerful 
reasons, rooted in free exercise values, to want to spare citizens the cruel choice of deciding 
whether to disobey either the government or their God.”). Professor Fallon’s article argues that 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence should appropriate free-exercise doctrine to foster greater 
clarity. Fallon, supra, at 60–62. Although his thesis primarily concerns the Establishment Clause, 
he provides vigorous discussion of, and nuanced insights into, free-exercise doctrine. Id. at 106–
12.  
 27. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219–20, 236 (1972) (observing that in “the 
Amish mode of life and education . . . belief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight 
compartments” before granting the Amish an exemption from a state compulsory-education law); 
see also id. at 247 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The Court rightly rejects the notion that actions, even 
though religiously grounded, are always outside the protection of the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment. In so ruling, the Court departs from the [belief-action] teaching of 
[Reynolds].”).  
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religious conduct at issue posed a threat to the peace of society.28 Over 
time, this expansive trajectory ripened into strict scrutiny for free-
exercise challenges. 
For example, in Sherbert v. Verner,29 a Seventh Day Adventist 
woman was fired from her job because she refused to work on 
Saturdays in accordance with her religious tradition’s Sabbath.30 
Although she was offered several subsequent jobs, they also entailed 
Saturday work.31 Persistent in her refusal to work on her Sabbath, she 
applied for state unemployment benefits but was denied.32 She 
therefore alleged that South Carolina’s rejection of her application 
violated her free-exercise rights.33  
The Supreme Court agreed, stating that regulation burdening 
free-exercise rights must serve a “compelling state interest” and 
generally will not be upheld unless the religious conduct in question 
“pose[s] some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.”34 The 
Court further observed that “in this highly sensitive constitutional area, 
‘[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests’” permit 
the limitation of free-exercise rights.35 Thus, in the wake of Sherbert, 
the Court’s free-exercise jurisprudence has exhibited an arc toward 
applying strict scrutiny to free-exercise challenges.36 Cases involving 
 
 28. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304, 311 (1940) (suggesting a trajectory 
toward strict scrutiny and noting that the state “raised no such clear and present menace to public 
peace and order as to render [Cantwell] liable to conviction of the common law offense in 
question”). 
 29. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  
 30. Id. at 399. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 401. The South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act stated that a claimant 
was ineligible for compensation if she “failed, without good cause . . . to accept available suitable 
work when offered.” Id. at 400 n.3 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 68-114(3)(a)(ii) (1962)). 
 33. Id. at 401. 
 34. Id. at 403. Although strict scrutiny has typically applied, courts have often refracted the 
test through Sherbert’s triadic “safety, peace or order” language. See, e.g., Paul v. Watchtower 
Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 882 (9th Cir. 1987) (using “safety, peace or order” 
triad in applying strict scrutiny); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972) (including 
the triad in its application of strict scrutiny in order to allow Amish families to remove their 
children from public education in accordance with their religious tradition).  
 35. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). 
 36. For the sake of brevity, this Note will not include a sustained discussion of Employment 
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which upheld 
the state’s denial of unemployment benefits for Native American church members using peyote 
because Oregon’s law was neutral and generally applicable. Although certainly important in the 
grand scheme of free-exercise jurisprudence, Smith does not functionally change this Note’s 
analysis. Nor should Smith be interpreted as established doctrine in free-exercise jurisprudence. 
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shunning, however, present particularly complex issues in this area of 
constitutional law and demonstrate why other First Amendment 
frameworks might be inapposite for religious-discipline cases.37  
Indeed, unlike other cases involving government regulation, 
shunning cases often implicate competing First Amendment rights: 
those of the religious group and those of the shunned party. That is, the 
Free Exercise Clause secures the freedom of a religious group to 
worship as it sees fit (including through disciplinary practices), just as 
it secures the freedom of the individual to worship as she sees fit 
(including through her dissociation from the community). Which 
liberties should trump? Courts and commentators differ in their 
responses.38 Adding a layer of complexity to this inquiry is the state’s 
interest in protecting citizens by granting them redress in tort. In this 
context, state interests and constitutional interests are often weighed, 
balanced, and ultimately pitted against each other.39 Thus, shunning 
produces multiple layers of constitutional analysis that are not often 
present in other free-exercise contexts.40  
Furthermore, shunning cases often raise questions of parishioner 
consent and ecclesiastical jurisdiction; which is to say, religious groups 
often take courses of action against former congregants, even after they 
have been excluded from the community. This raises two questions: 
first, whether the former member consented to this sort of behavior 
even when she no longer participates in the life of the community; and 
second, whether legal interference with a religious group’s disciplinary 
measures inhibits the group’s free-exercise rights. Courts have 
 
See, e.g., Brief of Christian Legal Soc’y et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-11), 2017 WL 
4005662, at *6 (“Smith’s rule . . . has not become embedded in the law.”). Indeed, the Court 
interpreted Smith in but one abbreviated instance. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City 
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32 (1993) (discussing Smith). The facts there demonstrated such 
clear animus that the Court would have ruled the same way regardless of the standard it 
employed. See id. at 542 (discussing the City of Hialeah ordinances which purposefully targeted 
Santeria religious practices). 
 37. But see Wiesen, supra note 12, at 292 (arguing that defamation law’s definitional 
approach should apply to free-exercise jurisprudence). 
 38. For a compendium of the various shunning cases that have addressed this sort of issue, 
see Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Comment, Religious Torts: Applying the Consent Doctrine as 
Definitional Balancing, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 949, 954 n.29 (1986).  
 39. For further discussion, see infra Part II.A. (analyzing Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 
389 (Tex. 2007)). 
 40. See Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 882–83 n.6 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (noting that shunning represents a sui generis area of free-exercise doctrine).  
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answered these questions in multivalent ways, producing a complex 
jurisprudence that warrants attention.  
B. Shunning Jurisprudence: A Constellation of Confusion 
American courts have applied different frameworks and standards 
to similar factual scenarios in shunning cases. This variance is perhaps 
best illustrated by three seminal cases: Bear v. Reformed Mennonite 
Church,41 Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc.,42 
and Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville.43 Bear represents an early 
iteration of shunning jurisprudence in which the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania was reticent to grant broad constitutional immunity to a 
religious practice that harmed church members. Guinn and Paul, by 
contrast, represent more developed—yet distinct—iterations of 
shunning jurisprudence. While the court in Guinn exhibited an over-
reliance on consent and membership to its detriment, Paul advanced a 
framework more consistent with organizational free-exercise 
principles. Fundamentally, though, all three cases demonstrate the 
need for a more searching legal solution to shunning. 
1. Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church: A Primitive Forerunner. 
Shunning is an integral component of the Mennonite faith.44 In Bear v. 
Reformed Mennonite Church, plaintiff Robert Bear challenged his 
Mennonite church’s shunning practices by suing and alleging that the 
church collapsed his business and family.45 Although the lower court 
took the view that the Free Exercise Clause was an affirmative defense 
à la Sherbert, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned the lower 
court and maintained that it may be possible for Bear to recover.46  
Decisive for the court was the fact that, under Sherbert, “the 
‘shunning’ practice of appellee church . . . may be an excessive 
interference within areas of ‘paramount state concern,’ i.e. the 
maintenance of marriage and family relationship, alienation of 
 
 41. Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 341 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1975).  
 42. Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 43. Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989). 
 44. See ROBERT L. BEAR, DELIVERED UNTO SATAN 1–4 (1974) (discussing the various 
shunning practices of the Reformed Mennonite Church and the importance of shunning to the 
religious community). 
 45. Bear, 341 A.2d at 106. Bear did not allege that the church violated his free-exercise rights 
through its practices, as is often the case in shunning lawsuits. See, e.g., Guinn, 775 P.2d at 773 
(discussing the free-exercise rights upon which the plaintiff staked her claim).  
 46. Bear, 341 A.2d at 108. It consequently sustained the defendant’s demurrer. Id. 
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affection, and the tortious interference with a business relationship.”47 
Thus, the First Amendment did not provide the church with an 
absolute privilege against Bear’s religious-tort claim. Under Bear, 
then, protecting marital, familial, and business relationships might 
provide the government with a sufficient basis for curtailing treasured 
free-exercise interests, even under Sherbert’s “compelling interest” 
standard.48 So even though Bear’s holding is unambitious and its 
reasoning shallow, it shows that a court might potentially find shunning 
to constitute an abuse so “grave[]” that not even a heightened free-
exercise defense will pass muster.49  
2. Paul v. Watchtower: A Near-Absolute Free-Exercise Privilege.  
Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc.50 is situated 
on the opposite end of the First Amendment spectrum from Bear. In 
Paul, the Ninth Circuit extended much greater protection to 
congregational practices and exhibited much less concern for the 
shunned plaintiff’s recovery. However, the facts of Paul fail to account 
for this difference. 
In Paul, plaintiff Janice Paul—a member of a Jehovah’s Witness 
church—voluntarily withdrew herself from her congregation.51 This 
made her a “disassociated person” according to Jehovah’s Witness 
teaching, a status that bore little consequence at that time.52 Shortly 
thereafter, the Governing Body of Jehovah’s Witnesses changed its 
previous doctrine concerning disassociated persons, and members 
were told to treat Paul like a “disfellowshiped person[]”—that is, to 
 
 47. Id. at 107. The court did not apply strict scrutiny as it has appeared in other free-exercise 
contexts—for example, the employment context. Instead, the court was merely examining 
whether the church’s practices violated imperative state interests. Id. In Connor v. Archdiocese 
of Philadelphia, 975 A.2d 1084 (Pa. 2009), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed Bear’s 
“excessive interference” test. Id. at 1112. 
 48. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
 49. Bear, 341 A.2d at 108 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)). 
 50. 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 51. Id. at 876. 
 52. Id. at 876–77. At the time Paul withdrew her membership from the Jehovah’s Witness 
community, there was “no express sanction” for being a disassociated person. Id. at 877. “In fact, 
because of the close nature of many Jehovah’s Witness communities, disassociated persons were 
still consulted in secular matters, e.g. legal or business advice, although they were no longer 
members of the Church.” Id. Indeed, even after Paul moved away from the area, she returned to 
the community in 1980 and “saw Church members and was warmly greeted.” Id.  
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refrain from talking to her altogether.53 After being rejected and 
ignored by numerous congregants, Paul sued for “defamation, invasion 
of privacy, fraud, and outrageous conduct.”54  
Applying Washington state law, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
district court, which granted summary judgment to the church on First 
Amendment grounds.55 Analogizing to the First Amendment’s 
treatment under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,56 the court reasoned 
that “[i]mposing tort liability for shunning on the Church or its 
members would in the long run have the same effect as prohibiting the 
practice and would compel the Church to abandon part of its religious 
teachings.”57 Extending this logic, the court asserted that “[a] religious 
organization has a defense of constitutional privilege to claims that it 
has caused intangible harms—in most, if not all, circumstances.”58 
According to the court, then, even if Paul did set forth a prima facie 
tort claim, the defendants enjoyed a complete First Amendment 
privilege to dignitary torts.59 Employing the Sherbert triad,60 the court 
 
 53. Id. at 876–77 (“‘Disfellowshiped persons’ are former members who have been 
excommunicated from the Church. One consequence of disfellowship is ‘shunning,’ a form of 
ostracism.”).  
 54. Id. at 877. 
 55. Id. at 884. 
 56. Id. at 880 (noting the similarity between libel and religious torts in assessing 
constitutional claims). 
 57. Id. at 881. 
 58. Id. at 883. It is difficult to extrapolate what sort of harm would have led the Ninth Circuit 
to find liability. The court granted wide latitude to religious entities to exercise their doctrines. 
Id. However, the court did not say much about what sort of tangible harms—for example, bodily 
or economic injury—could give rise to tort liability. But the court’s language along these lines was 
telling:  
The test for upholding a direct burden on religious practices is as stringent as any 
imposed under our Constitution. Only in extreme and unusual cases has the imposition 
of a direct burden on religion been upheld. . . . The harms suffered by Paul as a result 
of her shunning by the Jehovah’s Witnesses are clearly not of the type that would justify 
the imposition of tort liability for religious conduct. No physical assault or battery 
occurred. Intangible or emotional harms cannot ordinarily serve as a basis for 
maintaining a tort cause of action against a church for its practices—or against its 
members. 
Id. Cf. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 12–13 (Tex. 2008) (denying 
plaintiff recovery under Paul, even though clergy members held her down and deprived her of 
sleep during exorcism ceremonies). 
 59. See Paul, 819 F.2d at 879 (declining to rule whether Paul had presented a prima facie tort 
claim “because the defendants . . . possess[ed] an affirmative defense of privilege”). 
 60. The court eschewed strict-scrutiny language. See id. at 882 n.6 (employing a substantial-
harm analysis). That said, the court observed that its analysis would be practically identical, 
whatever test it applied to the claim. Id. (“[W]ere we to follow the exemption approach in Paul’s 
case, we would make the same analysis and reach the same result we do in the text.”). 
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further found that shunning did not present a “sufficient threat to the 
peace, safety, or morality of the community as to warrant state 
intervention.”61 Accordingly, society must tolerate offensive religious 
practices (like shunning) in order to afford religious congregations 
sufficient breathing space for free exercise.62 Paul, too, had to tolerate 
the shunning, as she was unable to recover from the church. 
Another important feature of the court’s analysis was its treatment 
of membership. Beyond Paul, several jurisdictions regard membership 
as dispositive to a free-exercise analysis.63 If a person is no longer a 
member of a religious community—and, as such, is only a former 
member—then a court might be more prone to award tort damages.64 
But to the Ninth Circuit, Paul’s former membership status weighed 
against her case for recovery.65 As long as the church “impose[d] 
discipline on members or former members,” it enjoyed “great latitude” 
to do so.66 Membership remains an important component of the 
constitutional inquiry, but in a way that does not meaningfully 
differentiate between current and former members. Thus, Paul 
highlights the disparate frameworks that courts apply to religious 
organizations, as well as the varied criteria that factor into courts’ free-
exercise calculi. Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville67 further 
exposes this striking disconnect. 
3. Guinn v. Church of Christ Collinsville: Tort Liability, Sooner or 
Later.  In Guinn, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma examined a church’s 
disciplinary actions against a parishioner who unilaterally withdrew her 
membership. Parishioner Marian Guinn joined the Collinsville Church 
of Christ in 1974 and enjoyed a harmonious relationship with the 
 
 61. Id. at 883. Compare supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text (discussing that the Bear 
court, applying the same test from Sherbert, concluded otherwise).  
 62. Id. (“Without society’s tolerance of offenses to sensibility, the protection of religious 
differences mandated by the [F]irst [A]mendment would be meaningless.”). 
 63. Compare Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 398 (Tex. 2007) (observing that 
membership weighs in favor of First Amendment protection over religious activities), with Guinn 
v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 785 (Okla. 1989) (holding that nonmembership 
obviated the church’s First Amendment privilege).  
 64. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 780–81. 
 65. Paul, 819 F.2d at 883. Indeed, the court noted, “[p]roviding the Church with a defense to 
tort is particularly appropriate here because Paul is a former Church member. Courts generally 
do not scrutinize closely the relationship among members (or former members) of a church.” Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989). 
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church for six years.68 However, in 1980, pursuant to the church’s 
disciplinary procedures,69 the elders confronted Guinn several times 
and exhorted her to discontinue her sexual relationship with a male 
Collinsville resident.70 These attempts to elicit repentance were very 
intrusive. For example, the elders confronted Guinn at a laundromat 
and even at her own residence, instructing her that “if she did not 
appear before the congregation and repent of her fornication sin, [they] 
would ‘withdraw fellowship’ from her.”71 During the latter “driveway 
incident,” Guinn communicated to the elders that she wished to be left 
alone and would not confess anything to the congregation; she 
subsequently ceased to attend church.72 
The elders then sent Guinn a letter, warning her that they would 
withdraw her fellowship and inform the congregation of her 
“fornication” if she did not comply with the church’s disciplinary 
doctrine. In response, Guinn and her lawyer sent the elders letters 
imploring them not to expose Guinn’s private life.73 Guinn’s letter also 
explicitly withdrew her membership from the congregation.74 On 
October 4, 1981, the church elders nevertheless divulged her 
“fornication” to the Collinsville congregation and four other area 
congregations.75 
As a result, Guinn sued the church for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and invasion of privacy.76 After the trial court 
overruled the defendant elders’ demurrers, it submitted the case to the 
 
 68. Id. at 767. 
 69. Id. at 768. This procedure was dictated by a literal interpretation of the Bible:  
[I]f thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and 
him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother.  
  But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth 
of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he shall neglect to hear 
them, tell it unto the church: but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee 
as a heathen man and a publican.  
Id. at 768 n.1 (quoting Matthew 18:13–17 (King James)). A literal interpretation of this passage 
has led to numerous ecclesial shunning practices and legal disputes. See, e.g., infra note 109 and 
accompanying text.  
 70. Id. at 768.  
 71. Id. (citation omitted). The withdrawal of fellowship set in motion a series of concomitant 
church discipline that included announcing the disfellowshipped member’s violations to nearby 
Church of Christ congregations as well as socially ostracizing the disfellowshipped member. Id. at 
768 n.2. 
 72. Id. at 791 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 776. 
 75. Id. at 768–69. 
 76. Id. at 769. 
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jury, which awarded Guinn actual and punitive damages in the amount 
of $434,737.77 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma concluded 
that Guinn could not recover for the church’s prewithdrawal 
disciplinary actions, but she could recover for its postwithdrawal 
tortious actions.78 
Membership again played a central role in the case. According to 
the church’s doctrine, members could not disassociate themselves from 
the church by withdrawing membership—as in a family, they were 
members for life.79 Therefore, the church asserted that “[a] court’s 
determination that Parishioner effectively withdrew her membership 
and thus her consent to submit to church doctrine would . . . be a 
constitutionally impermissible state usurpation of religious discipline 
accomplished through judicial interference.”80 The church further 
argued that its disciplinary procedures were already commenced before 
the plaintiff had withdrawn her membership.81 Consequently, it was 
entitled to carry out the remainder of the already-commenced 
disciplinary practices.82  
The court disagreed, reasoning that just as the Free Exercise 
Clause protects a religious institution’s free-exercise rights, so too does 
it secure an individual’s right to recede from a religious allegiance.83 
This individual right, the court maintained, cannot be extinguished 
unless a parishioner manifests a “knowing and intelligent waiver” of 
it.84 Because Guinn did not knowingly waive her free-exercise right, she 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 786. 
 79. Id. at 769 (further, “[an] Elder told [Guinn] that withdrawing membership from the 
Church of Christ was not only doctrinally impossible but it could not halt the disciplinary sanction 
being carried out against her” (emphasis omitted)).  
 80. Id. at 776. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. at 779 (“No real freedom to choose religion would exist in this land if under the 
shield of the First Amendment religious institutions could impose their will on the unwilling and 
claim immunity from secular judicature for their tortious acts.”). To support this conclusion, the 
court drew upon Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961), which upheld an individual’s right 
not to worship. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 776 & n.38.  
 84. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 775. The court did not discuss what such a waiver would entail, only 
that it would at least require a parishioner’s knowledge of her individual free-exercise rights and 
the attendant circumstances conditioning those rights, her volitional capacity to relinquish those 
rights, and her intention to do so—all conspicuously manifested. Id. at 777 n.42. Guinn alleged 
that she was not taught about the church’s doctrine that membership is an insoluble, lifetime 
bond. Therefore, the court concluded that “[t]he intentional and voluntary relinquishment of a 
known right required for a finding of an effective waiver was never established.” Id. at 777. 
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could unilaterally withdraw her membership from the church at any 
time—albeit only in written form.85 So for the court, inherent to the 
individual’s right to freely worship is the right not to worship.86 This 
individual free-exercise right cannot be occluded by the institutional 
free-exercise rights of the congregation. 
The court’s treatment of consent also raised significant free-
exercise questions. Claiming complete consonance with the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning in Paul, the Guinn court stated that the dispositive 
issue before it was whether Guinn had consented to the church’s 
disciplinary measures.87 Before Guinn’s letter to the church, she had; 
after her letter, she had not.88 Because consent was a requisite for the 
church’s disciplinary measures, the court held that she could not be 
subject to the church’s postwithdrawal disciplinary practices and could 
accordingly recover damages from the church.89  
Finally, the Guinn court distinguished the disciplinary proceedings 
of the Collinsville Church of Christ from the disciplinary proceedings 
that took place in Paul.90 It observed that the postresignation measures 
in Paul were passive, whereas the measures from the Collinsville 
church were invasive and active.91 The court accordingly reasoned that 
“religiously-motivated disciplinary measures that merely exclude a 
person from communion are vastly different from those which are 
 
 85. See id. at 777 n.43 (recognizing the significance of Guinn’s written withdrawal of 
membership). This writing requirement can also be gathered from the court’s inferential chain of 
reasoning. Even though Guinn halted church attendance and expressed her desire to be left alone, 
the court found that only her letter severed her membership ties. Id. at 784. The express writing 
requirement the majority imposed is curious and arbitrary; this is highlighted below in Justice 
Wilson’s dissent. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.  
 86. Id. at 777.  
 87. See id. at 780–81 (distinguishing Paul, where the discipline was passive and did not 
require consent, from the instant case, where the disciplinary scheme was designed to control and 
exclude). By contrast, Judge Hodges’s dissent points out that the factual situation in Paul was 
very similar. Id. at 794 (Hodges, J., dissenting). 
 88. Id. at 784. The court held this despite the fact that Guinn’s conduct could have been 
interpreted as a constructive withdrawal of her membership. Id. at 791. (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 89. See id. at 785 (“Because Parishioner was neither a present nor a prospective church 
member at the time of the Elders’ publication, the members of the Collinsville congregation did 
not share the sort of common interest in Parishioner’s behavior that would render the occasion 
of the publication privileged.”). 
 90. Id. at 780; see also supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 91. See id. at 780–81 (“[T]he Elders continued actively to discipline and punish her for past 
disobedience of its doctrinal precepts.”).  
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designed to control and involve.”92 The church’s measures constituting 
the latter, its conduct was actionable. 
Justice Wilson dissented from the majority’s insistence that a 
formal written statement be a prerequisite for withdrawing church 
membership.93 Instead, she argued that words and conduct which 
clearly express an individual’s rejection of doctrine should be 
sufficient.94 She therefore advocated a more functionalist view of 
church membership than did the majority.95 
For his part, Justice Hodges dissented in toto and proposed a 
contract paradigm for analyzing church membership and consent.96 He 
argued that Guinn voluntarily joined the church and, upon doing so, 
she submitted to its laws and surrendered her religious liberty to the 
extent that it would grant her relief from church discipline in tort.97 The 
elders were therefore entitled to believe that Guinn was a member for 
life and to carry on their disciplinary proceedings.98 Thus, Justice 
Hodges argued that “the Church and the Elders were constitutionally 
protected under the First Amendment from civil liability to discipline 
Parishioner by the withdrawal of fellowship proceedings both during 
her church membership and after her unilateral withdrawal from the 
Church.”99 This position aligns more with the constitutional reasoning 
in Paul and, hence, more with an institutional lens for free-exercise 
protection.100 
 
 92. Id. at 781 (emphasis omitted). The court’s passive-active distinction is specious. Indeed, 
inactive conduct can be just as potent and effective as active conduct. And even though numerous 
courts have relied on this analytical distinction, see, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 
567 U.S. 519, 552–58 (2012) (employing the passive-active rationale to support its holding), jurists 
are right to criticize it for being too legally and philosophically amorphous. See Trinity Lutheran 
Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2025–26 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) 
(criticizing the passive-active distinction in a broader critique of the religious status-use 
distinction). The Guinn majority’s use of the passive-active distinction to distinguish Paul was 
therefore questionable. For the sake of brevity, however, this Note will not explore the issue any 
further. 
 93. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 791 (Wilson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 94. Id. 
 95. For an account of why a contract paradigm favors Justice Wilson’s functionalist 
approach, see infra notes 254–61. 
 96. Id. at 792, 795 (Hodges, J., dissenting). Justice Hodges’s dissent will be utilized to 
advance the contract framework below. 
 97. Id. at 794. 
 98. Id. at 796. 
 99. Id. at 792.  
 100. See supra notes 57–67 and accompanying text. 
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To recap, the courts in Bear, Paul, and Guinn reached vastly 
different conclusions regarding similar instances of shunning, and all 
staked their holdings on different lines of legal reasoning. These 
foundational cases typify the way that shunning analysis varies widely 
from court to court, especially vis-à-vis the concepts of consent and 
membership. The court in Bear found for the shunned person with little 
attention given to consent or membership; instead, the Bear court 
suggested that protecting individuals through tort liability could serve 
as a compelling government interest. The court in Paul, on the other 
hand, did not view consent or membership to be dispositive given its 
robust view of the First Amendment’s protection of shunning practices. 
And the court in Guinn made consent and membership central to its 
analysis, thus elevating individual free-exercise liberties. In an area of 
such great constitutional consequence, such dissonance is cause for 
alarm. 
II.  PENLEY AND HADNOT: THE INADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING 
PARADIGM 
In the wake of the foregoing shunning jurisprudence, the 
neighboring supreme courts of Texas and Oklahoma were faced with 
similar shunning cases. These cases—more modern and developed 
iterations of shunning doctrine—are the progeny of an unclear body of 
First Amendment law. Hence, the courts’ analyses accentuate the 
inadequacy of existing paradigms and demonstrate the need for a new 
one.  
A. Westbrook v. Penley: Wrong for the Right Reasons 
1. Background.  Westbrook v. Penley101 tracks closely with the facts 
of other shunning cases.102 Peggy Lee Penley, the plaintiff, was having 
marital issues with her husband.103 She sought counseling from a 
licensed marriage counselor, defendant Buddy Westbrook, who also 
happened to be Penley’s fellow parishioner at McKinney Memorial 
Bible Church.104 
 
 101. 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007). 
 102. See, e.g., Guinn, 775 P.2d at 767–69 (describing a similar shunning fact pattern); Paul v. 
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 876–78 (9th Cir. 1987) (same). 
 103. Penley, 231 S.W.3d at 392. 
 104. Id. In 1998, for example, Westbrook conducted three counseling sessions with Penley at 
his office; he also conducted two counseling sessions with her husband. Id. 
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In 1999, Westbrook and others—including Penley and her 
husband—broke from McKinney Bible Church to form their own 
church, CrossLand Community Bible Church.105 Westbrook was 
nominated to serve as the church’s inaugural pastor, and the church 
vowed to operate “according to biblical principles.”106 The church’s 
statement of faith, to which each membership applicant was required 
to assent before joining the church, included a disciplinary policy which 
sought to bring sinners to repentance and keep the community pure.107 
To this end, the church’s constitution contained the following 
provisions:  
[T]he elders will biblically and lovingly utilize every appropriate 
means to restore members who find themselves in patterns of serious 
misconduct. When efforts at restoration fail, the elders will apply the 
Biblical teaching on church discipline, which could include revocation 
of membership, along with an appropriate announcement made to the 
membership.  
. . . [I]f a member engages in conduct which “violates Biblical 
standards, or which is detrimental to the ministry, unity, peace or 
purity of the church . . . the elders will follow our Lord’s instructions 
from Matthew 18:15–20.”108 
Thus, the church’s procedure for correcting alleged misconduct 
included shunning the offender and disseminating information about 
his or her actions to the congregation.109 During CrossLand’s maiden 
months, Penley explicitly assented to the church constitution: “I can 
abide by the church constitution,” she affirmed.110  
Penley’s relationship with her husband further deteriorated, and 
after separating, the two participated in a series of weekly counseling 
sessions with other couples at Westbrook’s home.111 According to 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See id. (“[The church believes] that one of the primary responsibilities of the church is to 
maintain the purity of the Body. . . . The church’s stated goal is to encourage repentance . . . .”). 
 108. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). For the import of Matthew 18:15–20, see supra 
note 69 and accompanying text. Ecclesial shunning policies guided by fundamentalist 
interpretations of Matthew 18 often culminate in church leaders announcing to the congregation 
the cause of the shunned parishioner’s expulsion of the community.  
 109. See id. at 392 & n.1 (including such forms of discipline as revocation of membership, 
appropriate announcements to the church membership, and treating the sinner as a “Gentile and 
a tax collector”). 
 110. Id. at 392–93. 
 111. Id. at 393. 
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Penley, these sessions were an extension of her previous marital 
counseling, and the Bible was never discussed.112 
Around October 2000, Penley and her husband went to 
Westbrook’s home for a counseling session. During a break, Penley 
spoke separately with Westbrook and confided that she had engaged 
in an extramarital sexual relationship and intended to divorce her 
husband.113 Westbrook provided further counseling and recommended 
a family-law attorney to Penley.114 Yet when Westbrook broached the 
topic of the disciplinary measures that the church would have to take 
as a result of her extramarital relationship, Penley explained that she 
was resigning from CrossLand Church.115 Westbrook and the church 
elders nevertheless drafted a letter to the CrossLand congregation that 
encouraged them to “treat [Penley] as an outsider” and explained that 
Penley had been involved in a “biblically inappropriate relationship 
with another man.”116 After this letter was published on November 7, 
2001,117 Penley sued CrossLand, Westbrook, and the church elders for 
the church’s shunning practices.118 She also sued Westbrook in his 
professional capacity as a marital counselor.119 
2. Penley’s lawsuit.  Penley alleged defamation, breach of fiduciary 
duty, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and professional 
negligence.120 In response, Westbrook filed a motion to dismiss, 
asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction because the suit involved an 
“ecclesiastical dispute,” which the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
preclude from civil adjudication.121 The church and elders filed similar 
motions to dismiss, and the trial court granted all of the defendants’ 
motions.122 Penley appealed the dismissal only as to Westbrook.123 The 
 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. Unlike the letter in Guinn, this letter admonished the congregation to treat the matter 
as a members-only issue, not to be shared with those outside the congregation. Further, 
CrossLand did not itself send the letter to any church affiliates. See supra note 69 and 
accompanying text. 
 118. Id. at 394. 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id.  
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
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court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of all claims against Westbrook 
except for professional negligence, which it held concerned Westbrook 
in his capacity as Penley’s secular professional counselor and, hence, 
did not implicate First Amendment protection.124 The Supreme Court 
of Texas granted Westbrook’s petition for review of whether the trial 
court had jurisdiction over Penley’s professional negligence claim in 
light of the First Amendment.125 
The court began its analysis by highlighting the difficulty of 
drawing lines between the “secular” and the “religious” in marital 
counseling, especially for liminal relationships such as the one between 
Westbrook and Penley.126 The court then suggested that these blurred 
lines call for a balancing of the respective secular and religious interests 
at stake.127 While the state’s interest in protecting communications 
between licensed professional counselors and their clients was 
important,128 the countervailing interest was a church’s constitutional 
right to self-governance—a right that “has long been afforded broad 
constitutional protection.”129 Therefore, however heightened the 
state’s interest in preserving client confidentiality may be,130 it cannot 
eclipse a church’s free-exercise interest in disciplining its members 
according to the tenets of its faith.131 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 396. Numerous commentators have also highlighted this difficulty. See Robert J. 
Basil, Note, Clergy Malpractice: Taking Spiritual Counseling Conflicts Beyond Intentional Tort 
Analysis, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 419, 437 (1988) (“Family counseling and psychological counseling are 
two notable areas in which there is substantial overlap between the secular and religious . . . .”); 
cf. C. Eric Funston, Comment, Made Out of Whole Cloths? A Constitutional Analysis of the Clergy 
Malpractice Concept, 19 CAL. W. L. REV. 507, 514–16 (1983) (quoting Samuel E. Ericsson, 
Clergyman Malpractice: Ramifications of a New Theory, 16 VAL. U. L. REV. 163, 166 (1981)) 
(noting that pastoral counseling is a religious rather than secular activity wherein “[it] is 
impossible to separate the cure of the minds from the cure of the souls”).  
 127. Penley, 231 S.W.3d at 396.  
 128. Id. at 402. 
 129. Id. at 397 (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733 (1872)). 
 130. See R.K. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836, 840 (Tex. 1994) (“The basis for [counselor-client] 
privileges is twofold: (1) to encourage the full communication necessary for effective treatment, 
and (2) to prevent unnecessary disclosure of highly personal information.” (citation omitted)).  
 131. The Penley court noted the general tendency for courts to protect free-exercise rights 
over other important interests: 
The values that underlie the constitutional interest in prohibiting judicial 
encroachment upon a church’s ability to manage its affairs and discipline its members, 
who have voluntarily united themselves to the church body and impliedly consented to 
be bound by its standards, have been zealously protected. When presented with 
conflicting interests like these, courts have generally held that ‘a spirit of freedom for 
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The court next addressed Penley’s contention that her claims did 
not implicate matters of church governance. Since she only sought to 
sue Westbrook in his capacity as a licensed counselor, she argued, her 
claim did not require a court to explore religious doctrine.132 The court 
summarily rejected this argument. It determined that Westbrook’s 
disclosure could not be isolated from the church’s disciplinary 
proceedings due to the parties’ intimate ties to the church.133 And 
because “‘[t]he relationship between an organized church and its 
ministers is its lifeblood,’”134 inquest into Westbrook’s counseling 
duties would represent a First Amendment violation even if 
Westbrook’s secular and pastoral roles could be differentiated.135 Thus, 
although Penley’s professional-negligence claim could be defined by 
neutral principles of law, the application of those principles would 
impinge upon CrossLand’s autonomy.136 
 The court subsequently distinguished cases in which courts 
reviewed a clergy member’s counseling behavior and found it to be 
tortious.137 Unlike those cases, the court reasoned, Westbrook’s 
disclosure to the congregation was “mandated by doctrine” and did not 
endanger “Penley’s or the public’s health or safety.”138 Consequently, 
the court affirmed the dismissal of Penley’s professional negligence 
claim.139 
The court concluded by addressing a question germane to almost 
all shunning cases: Does a plaintiff’s resignation from a religious 
 
religious organizations’ prevails, even if that freedom comes at the expense of other 
interests of high social importance.  
Penley, 213 S.W.3d at 403 (citations omitted) (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of 
Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)). 
 132. See id. at 400 (“Rather, Penley explains, her suit centers on Westbrook’s initial disclosure 
to the church elders of confidential information obtained during the marital counseling sessions, 
which she claims constituted a breach of professional counseling standards.”). 
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. at 402 (citations omitted). 
 135. Id. (“Any civil liability that might attach for Westbrook’s violation of a secular duty of 
confidentiality in this context would in effect impose a fine for his decision to follow the religious 
disciplinary procedures that his role as pastor required and have a concomitant chilling effect on 
churches’ autonomy.”). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 403–04. The court, for example, distinguished Penley’s case from (among others) 
Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988), which held that the plaintiff who had engaged 
in a sexual relationship with her priest stated a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. 
 138. Id. at 404.  
 139. Id. 
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organization preclude a clergy member’s First Amendment privilege 
to discipline her? The court answered in the negative: 
Penley’s voluntary forfeiture of her membership did not, in 
CrossLand’s or Westbrook’s view, forestall the church’s duty under 
its constitution to “tell it to the church” . . . . Their decision to so 
proceed was based on . . . an inherently ecclesiastical matter. We 
hold that court interference with that decision through imposition of 
tort liability in this case would impinge upon matters of church 
governance in violation of the First Amendment.140 
In short, the Penley court determined that, because Penley “voluntarily 
became a member of the church body and agreed to abide by the 
church constitution,” she agreed to its disciplinary measures at the 
outset.141 She was therefore barred from bringing a claim—even one of 
professional negligence—because Westbrook’s conduct was connected 
to ecclesial doctrine, and the First Amendment precludes the 
adjudication of disputes concerning church membership.142 
3. Analysis.  “Consent” played a peripheral role in Penley, with the 
court declining to utilize it as an analytical framework.143 The court 
merely observed that members who voluntarily join a church impliedly 
consent to be bound by the body’s disciplinary measures.144 Instead, the 
court premised its holding on the weight of the constitutional interests 
at stake, the negative implications of imposing tort liability, and what 
Westbrook’s obligations entailed according to the church’s disciplinary 
doctrine.145  
This scant treatment comports with the Ninth Circuit’s restrained 
approach to consent in Paul.146 In Penley, consent was important ex 
ante; however, to make continued consent dispositive would be to 
encroach upon the church’s autonomy to manage its internal affairs—
 
 140. Id. at 404–05. 
 141. Id. at 402. 
 142. Id. at 404–05. 
 143. In fact, the court only mentions “consent” twice, and merely does so to address implied 
consent. Id. at 397, 403. 
 144. Id. at 403. 
 145. Id. at 396–405. This dearth of consent analysis demonstrates the court’s refusal to follow 
its sister court in Guinn. Indeed, the court references numerous religious-tort cases from other 
jurisdictions that preceded and followed Guinn, but never mentions Guinn itself, even though it 
is a foundational shunning case that pertains to the same issues. 
 146. Consent analysis is noticeably absent in Paul as well, as the Ninth Circuit does not 
address the issue at all. 
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a violation of the First Amendment.147 Moreover, the Penley court 
referenced a qualitatively different type of consent—implied 
consent—and was only concerned with it insofar as it was probative of 
entry into membership.148  
In these ways, Penley is almost entirely correct in its analysis. Its 
respect for stare decisis fosters theoretical coherence, and its expansive 
scope for free-exercise protection promotes the integrity of religious 
institutions. And the Penley court refrained from deploying consent as 
a vague analytical tool. That said, it is difficult to argue that Penley had 
the requisite ex ante consent to warrant providing Westbrook with 
such broad First Amendment protection.  
Indeed, because Penley’s relationship with Westbrook underwent 
a metamorphic transition, there is little indication that she knew or had 
reason to know that she would be disciplined for what she disclosed to 
him. Her counseling sessions did not take place at church, did not 
mention the Bible, and commenced before her licensed counselor 
became her pastor.149 If Penley thought that she would only be 
disciplined for what she disclosed in an ecclesiastical context—which, 
on the facts, seems to have been the case—then her consent was 
inapplicable to Westbrook’s actions. Thus, the case for ex ante consent 
was weak in Penley, even under a contractual rubric.150 
Membership stood in as the court’s analytical lynchpin. Yet 
membership, like consent, was only significant for the court to the 
 
 147. Penley, 231 S.W.3d at 405. 
 148. See id. at 397, 403 (implying that consent is voluntarily assumed from membership in a 
religious body). The court cites Watson for both instances in which it analyzes consent and church 
membership, and Watson applies an entirely different notion of consent than Guinn or Hadnot. 
See Lee W. Brooks, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Spiritual Counselors: Can 
Outrageous Conduct Be “Free Exercise”?, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1296, 1318 (1986) (“The Court 
in Watson v. Jones, however, used the concept of ‘implied consent’ not in the strict sense, 
employed in tort law, but more metaphorically to describe something like a jurisdictional conflict 
between the civil courts and religious authority.”). Brooks goes on to argue that when an 
individual participates long enough in a religious organization, he or she can be assumed to be 
familiar enough with its beliefs and practices and, as such, gives an appearance of consent by his 
or her mere presence in the religious group. Id. at 1318–19. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, on 
the other hand, underscores the explicit nature of consent—it must be manifested through words. 
See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 149. See Penley, 231 S.W.3d at 391–93 (describing Penley’s counseling sessions). 
 150. Additionally, the court failed to state why consent at the outset of membership should 
be the only constitutionally relevant inquiry. That the court spent such little time on consent 
illustrates its attention to protecting organizational religious freedoms—a worthy judicial aim. 
But the court should have discussed the role of consent in more detail given its doctrinal primacy 
in other jurisdictions. 
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extent that it was established ex ante.151 Once Penley became a 
member, her unilateral withdrawal did not affect the church’s duty or 
right to enact its disciplinary procedures in accordance with doctrine.152 
So for the Penley court, Penley’s voluntary resignation was largely 
irrelevant insofar as the First Amendment requires courts to abstain 
from inquest into church doctrine when it involves disciplining 
members or former members.153 This approach is more sensible than 
an approach premised on continued consent,154 but membership status 
should still not serve as a sine qua non for resolving shunning cases.155 
Indeed “[m]embership in a church creates a different relationship from 
that which exists in other voluntary societies formed for business, 
social, literary, or charitable purposes.”156 This difference is also 
present between the pastor-parishioner relationship and the counselor-
client relationship.157 
Next, the court acknowledged that there were valid competing 
interests and rights for both parties.158 But as was the case with 
consent—a prerequisite for membership—it is doubtful that Penley 
had reason to know that her membership granted Westbrook immunity 
from tort liability when acting in his capacity as a licensed counselor. 
This should have diminished the church’s free-exercise interest in 
protecting Westbrook as a counselor and, in turn, increased Penley’s 
interest in tort recovery. The state’s interest was the duty of 
confidentiality, which is intended to protect counselor-client 
communications.159 And although the court conceded that this interest 
 
 151. See Penley, 231 S.W.3d at 402 (Tex. 2007) (“Penley voluntarily became a member of the 
church body and agreed to abide by the church constitution; indeed, she expressed that she did 
so ‘willingly.’ That constitution outlined the disciplinary process that would be followed if a 
member engaged in conduct that the church considered inappropriate.”). 
 152. Id. at 404 (articulating the freedom to excommunicate as a “duty,” not just a right).  
 153. Id. 
 154. See infra notes 186–91. 
 155. Indeed, Penley claimed that “she did not receive . . . counseling from Westbrook in his 
capacity as a member.” Penley, 231 S.W.3d at 402. The court readily dismissed this argument, 
though, precisely because Penley and Westbrook were both contemporaneously members at one 
point in time.  
 156. Minton v. Leavell, 297 S.W.2d 615, 621–22 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). 
 157. Lawrence M. Burek, Comment, Clergy Malpractice: Making Clergy Accountable to a 
Lower Power, 14 PEPP. L. REV. 137, 139 (1986) (“While some degree of overlap and similarity 
may exist, the religious counselor remains distinct and unique from his secular counterpart, 
approaching therapy from an entirely different perspective.”). 
 158. Penley, 231 S.W.3d at 402–03.  
 159. Id. at 396. 
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was substantial,160 it failed to give it due weight merely because of the 
parties’ membership status.  
In other words, by focusing too single-mindedly on membership 
status, the court erroneously subsumed the counselor-client 
relationship into the pastor-parishioner relationship and wrongly 
affirmed the dismissal of Penley’s professional-negligence claim. 
Thus, even though sparse in its treatment of consent, Penley shows 
how problematic it is to resolve shunning cases solely through the lens 
of membership. Applying a contract paradigm to Penley would remedy 
this issue by looking not to the status of the parties but to whether—
and to what extent—the plaintiff manifested initial consent to church 
discipline.  
B. Hadnot v. Shaw: Right Result for the Wrong Reasons 
1. Background.  Hadnot v. Shaw,161 decided by the Supreme Court 
of Oklahoma before Penley, was based on a very different rationale. In 
Hadnot, two sister plaintiffs, Jeanne A. Hadnot and Suzette Renee 
Ellis, were parishioners at the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints in Chickasha, Oklahoma.162 Both parishioners were requested to 
be present at a “Church disciplinary hearing called to determine their 
membership status.”163 Neither attended.164 As a result, church leaders 
sent a letter to each detailing the grounds for her excommunication.165 
The letter addressed to Hadnot in particular, which was first opened 
and read by her husband, stated that her membership had been 
terminated because of “fornication.”166 The sisters accordingly claimed 
 
 160. Id. at 402–03. The court noted: 
We do not doubt that preserving client confidences revealed in the context of a 
professional counseling relationship serves an important public interest, as the duty the 
Legislature has imposed on such professionals reflects. . . . When presented with 
conflicting interests like these, courts have generally held that ‘a spirit of freedom for 
religious organizations’ prevails, even if that freedom comes at the expense of other 
interests of high social importance. 
Id. (citations omitted) (citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in 
North America, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)). 
 161. Hadnot v. Shaw, 826 P.2d 978 (Okla. 1992). 
 162. Id. at 980. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. The relevant portion of the letter from the church reads: “[Y]our membership should be 
removed from church records, for the reason of fornication.” Id. at 980 n.4.  
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damages for “harm from wilful [sic] or grossly negligent delivery of the 
expulsion letters.”167  
Furthermore, during the excommunication process, a church elder 
was asked by a congregant why the elders were “going after” the 
sisters, and the elder allegedly replied that the sisters’ 
excommunication proceedings were initiated because of 
“fornication.”168 This communication of the letters’ contents to the 
public was the second of the sisters’ claimed injuries.169 The theories 
undergirding these two claims included libel, slander, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy.170 
Hadnot is procedurally convoluted. To distill, the plaintiffs sought 
discovery pertaining to the church’s procedures and communications 
after their excommunication.171 But the district court denied the 
discovery request, holding that “by force of the First Amendment the 
information sought was privileged from secular judicial inquest.”172 
With the plaintiffs unable to engage in discovery, the district court 
therefore granted summary judgment for the defendants.173  
2. The decision on appeal.  On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court held that actions taken within a church’s valid judicature—that 
is, within its authority to discipline—are nondiscoverable.174 However, 
“any activity outside of valid church judicature . . . may be 
discoverable.”175 To determine the scope of the church’s judicature,176 
 
 167. Id. at 981. 
 168. Id. at 984. 
 169. Id. at 981. 
 170. In light of the “rather imprecise wording of the [plaintiffs’] pleadings and the briefs,” the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded “that [the plaintiffs] ha[d] alleged two delictual causes of 
action, advancing three theories of liability in support of each.” Id. at 980–81. The first cause of 
action—alleging negligent delivery of the letters—was grounded on theories of: 1) libel; 2) 
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress; and 3) invasion of privacy. Id. at 981. The 
second cause of action—for the harm caused by disseminating the slanderous information to the 
public—rested on theories of: 1) slander; 2) intentional or negligent infliction of emotional 
distress; and 3) invasion of privacy. Id. 
 171. Id. at 981. Several procedural issues were raised, but this was the only one that gave rise 
to constitutional analysis. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 979.  
 174. See id. at 990 (“Church judicature exercised within proper bounds of cognizance is not 
discoverable.”). Valid judicature is directly contingent upon a church member’s consent. See infra 
note 189 and accompanying text. 
 175. Id.  
 176. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  
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the court examined whether the trial court properly applied Guinn.177 
The court stated that, under Guinn, a church’s disciplinary judicature 
is contingent upon the “mutual agreement” between the church and its 
member.178 “That relationship,” the court continued, “may be severed 
freely by a member’s positive act at any time.”179 In this sense, the court 
aligned with Justice Wilson’s dissent in Guinn: conduct can be 
sufficient to break membership.180 Then, the court relied on Paul181 to 
assert the following: 
The church privilege extends in this case to activities or 
communications which occurred after excommunication if these may 
be termed as mere implementation of previously pronounced 
ecclesiastical sanction which was valid when exercised—i.e., that it 
was declared when Church jurisdiction subsisted. Within the concept 
of protected implementation are not only the religious disciplinary 
proceeding’s merits and procedure but also its end product—the 
expulsion sanction. While excommunication would put an end to 
jurisdiction over any further offense, it does not abrogate the 
consequences flowing from the previously announced Church 
judicature.182 
Hence, according to the Hadnot court, so long as a church’s activities 
are merely a continuation of enumerated disciplinary measures and are 
legitimately commenced before the member’s severance, then the 
consequences resulting from the church’s discipline are not 
actionable.183 Therefore, because the plaintiffs did not “positively act 
to withdraw membership” before their excommunication, the church 
retained its jurisdiction over them and was free to discipline them as it 
 
 177. Id. at 987–98. 
 178. Id. at 987. 
 179. Id. (citing Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989)) (emphasis 
added). 
 180. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text (discussing the Guinn majority’s insistence 
that a written revocation of membership be required to take a parishioner outside of a church’s 
judicature).  
 181. Hadnot, 826 P.2d at 987 n.44–45. There is nothing in Paul that corroborates the 
proposition that follows. In fact, Paul espouses the exact opposite proposition. The ecclesiastical 
sanctions in Paul were anything but previously pronounced; they underwent a drastic change 
while Paul was regarded as a “disassociated” person. See supra notes 52–54. The church in Paul 
nonetheless retained its privilege. 
 182. Hadnot, 826 P.2d at 987; see also infra notes 232–39 and accompanying text (critiquing 
this and asserting that, à la Justice Wilson’s dissent in Guinn, membership should be a more 
porous and fluid concept). 
 183. Hadnot, 826 P.2d at 987. 
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saw fit.184 After excommunication, however, it could only implement 
existing sanctions.185 
3. Analysis.  Consent served a different function in Hadnot than in 
Penley.186 In Hadnot, the court attempted to closely follow its own 
opinion in Guinn,187 which applied a “consent theory” of tort law.188 
Under a consent theory, “the church’s judicature rests solely on consent 
which in turn is anchored on the ecclesiastical respondent’s church 
affiliation.”189 And, as in Guinn, the court considered membership to 
be a proxy for consent.190 So as long as an individual is a church 
member, punishment is fair game, and the disciplinary measures taken 
by the church remain nondiscoverable. But once the relationship with 
a religious group has been “severed freely by a member’s positive act 
at any time,” the member presumptively removes her consent to the 
church’s authority, and the church’s disciplinary judicature recedes.191  
Whatever merit a consent theory might have, the court in Hadnot 
misinterpreted and misapplied Guinn, the precedent it was principally 
 
 184. Id. at 988. The court describes the process of terminating an ecclesiastical court’s 
jurisdiction as follows: 
To terminate an ecclesiastical court’s jurisdiction a positive and affirmative action is 
required. The action must impart due notice to the ecclesiastical body that its spiritual 
cognizance has come to an end as a result of the parishioners’ act of withdrawal. Silence 
and inactivity alone are not indicia of cessation. 
Id. at 988 n.46. It is unclear whether the court understood that, for many religious communities, 
expulsion and excommunication are quite different things. For example, in the Roman Catholic 
Church, when a member is excommunicated, she might still be invited to participate in church 
practices, although she may not participate in the sacraments. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC 
CHURCH, ¶ 1463 (2d ed. 2016). 
 185. Hadnot, 826 P.2d at 988. 
 186. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1979) explains, ”If words or 
conduct are reasonably understood by another to be intended as consent, they constitute apparent 
consent and are as effective as consent in fact.” This definition of “consent” is slightly tautologous, 
but it informs the discussion in the next section. 
 187. See Hadnot, 826 P.2d at 987–88 (discussing the trial court’s correct application of Guinn). 
 188. See Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 775–79, 784 n.70. (Okla. 1989) 
(emphasis added) (outlining the court’s consent theory); Wiesen, supra note 12, at 302 (“The 
court reasoned that the prewithdrawal actions were protected under a consent theory: While 
Guinn was a member, the Church had a right to rely on her consent to its disciplinary precepts.”). 
Wiesen refers to Guinn’s notion of conditioned discipline as “consent theory” throughout his 
article, and other commentators employ the same language. See, e.g., Cupp,  supra note 38, at 
97376 (promoting a consent theory to shunning jurisprudence). As such, this term is used in the 
analysis below. 
 189. Hadnot, 826 P.2d at 989 (emphasis omitted). 
 190. Id. at 989–90. 
 191. Id. at 987 (emphasis added).  
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concerned to follow.192 For example, in Hadnot, the court noted that, 
“[w]hile excommunication would put an end to jurisdiction over any 
further offense, it does not abrogate the consequences flowing from the 
previously announced Church judicature.”193 Yet the consequences 
flowing from a previously announced ecclesiastical judicature are 
precisely what the court refused to protect under the First Amendment 
in Guinn.194 Indeed, in Guinn, the Collinsville Church was held liable 
even though it merely continued the disciplinary practices it had 
already commenced before Guinn had withdrawn her membership.195 
Yet Hadnot’s version of consent only bars disciplinary measures 
commenced after a person withdraws her membership; a continuation 
of legitimate, prewithdrawal church discipline remains within a 
church’s judicature. Hadnot therefore represents a departure from 
doctrine. 
Regarding membership, the Hadnot court found it decisive that 
the parishioners had not officially withdrawn their membership before 
the disciplinary measures transpired.196 For the court, the failure to 
withdraw membership created a presumption of consent.197 However, 
the facts indicate anything but the parishioners’ consent to the 
excommunication methods used—a fact best portrayed by their 
decision to file suit. Moreover, the parishioners’ purposeful refusal to 
show up to their own excommunication proceedings should have 
constructively severed their membership (and thus consent). Thus, 
 
 192. See, e.g., Doe v. First Presbyterian Church U.S.A., No. 115,182, 2017 WL 1332134, at 
*12–13 (Okla. Feb. 22, 2017) (“In Hadnot v. Shaw, this Court reaffirmed the protection provided 
to churches to discipline their members free from outside interference from the courts, and 
backed away from the tort exception stressed in Guinn.” (citation omitted)). Although Doe has 
ultimately been withdrawn and superseded, Doe v. First Presbyterian Church U.S.A., 421 P.3d 
284 (Okla. 2017), its interpretation here demonstrates that the Hadnot court did not follow Guinn 
as closely as it purported. 
 193. Hadnot, 826 P.2d at 987. 
 194. See supra note 87–89 and accompanying text. 
 195. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. 
 196. Hadnot, 826 P.2d at 985 (“The parishioners had not withdrawn their membership at the 
time they received notice of their expulsion. Under the First Amendment, the procedural norms 
which govern the exercise of ecclesiastical cognizance are not subject to a secular court’s 
scrutiny.”); accord Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 783–84 (Okla. 1989) 
(“The law presumes that during the time she was a member of the church she voluntarily 
submitted to all known tenets of congregational discipline . . . . [W]hen Parishioner withdrew from 
the Church . . . she effectively revoked any consent upon which the Elders could have based a 
defense of ‘absolute privilege’ . . . .”). 
 197. Hadnot, 826 P.2d at 988 (“It is undisputed that in this case the parishioners never 
withdrew their membership from the Church. Thus in contemplation of law their consent to the 
Church’s disciplinary action stood unaffected.”). 
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membership obfuscated the court’s analysis in Hadnot, just as it did in 
Penley, and membership failed to resolve the consent quandary.  
III.   A CONTRACT PARADIGM FOR SHUNNING 
A. In Favor of Organizational Religious Rights 
In all of the foregoing cases—especially Penley and Hadnot—it 
quickly becomes clear that courts are unsure how to proceed when 
varied and competing interests are at stake. How should courts weigh 
the constitutional claims of religious organizations and individuals? 
Can courts equitably weigh the government’s interest in granting 
citizens tort recovery against a religious entity’s free-exercise rights? 
This Part argues for a more robust protection of organizational free-
exercise rights in shunning cases. 
Appealing to the First Amendment rights of a shunned individual 
alone is improper and only convolutes the constitutional analysis in the 
shunning context. Two problems emerge from the primacy of 
individual free-exercise rights. The first is conceptual: Modern free-
exercise jurisprudence has trended toward protecting individual 
religious rights at the expense of organizational religious rights.198 
Various commentators have posited reasons for this “disfavoritism . . . 
towards conceptualizing religious liberty in institutional terms,”199 
ranging from American liberalism’s influence on free-exercise 
jurisprudence200 to a general judicial inability to reason religiously.201 
Whatever the cause, there are scarcely “grounds to argue that free 
exercise protects only individual claims.”202 In fact, the Free Exercise 
Clause was originally intended to extend robust protection to the 
 
 198. See Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 
489–96 (1991) (discussing the trend of prioritizing individual free-exercise rights while “largely 
ignoring [the Free Exercise Clause’s] associational and institutional dimensions”). 
 199. Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional 
Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219, 256 (2000). 
 200. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious 
Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99, 100–01 (discussing the influence of liberalism and secularism 
on group religious rights). 
 201. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 
115, 126–27 (1992) (discussing the academic elitism that has caused the judiciary to become averse 
to sympathetic understandings of and protections for religious forms of life). 
 202. Garrett Epps, What We Talk About When We Talk About Free Exercise, 30 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 563, 593 (1998). 
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organizational dimensions of religious life.203 Organizational free-
exercise rights should therefore be central in a court’s shunning 
analysis. 
The second problem with an overemphasis on individual religious 
rights is practical: A religious group should not be forced to relinquish 
its First Amendment coverage merely because a shunned member will 
be harmed by its practices. Indeed, without the religious community, 
there might not be individual religious rights worth preserving in the 
first place—at least not in any meaningful sense.204 Moreover, the 
individual members of a religious congregation act in concert to 
practice deeply held religious beliefs.205 Allowing recovery in tort based 
on a consent theory would restrict the free exercise of religion for those 
individuals seeking to carry out their beliefs through communal 
disciplinary practices—something that the shunned member was best 
situated to recognize as a possibility to begin with.  This is chiefly 
because consent removes the judicature from the aegis of the religious 
entity and relocates it in the individual. In doing so, consent 
disproportionately assigns weight to the individual’s interests over and 
against the community’s. Accordingly, a framework that brings consent 
 
 203. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1132 
(1991) (“A close look at the Bill [of Rights] reveals structural ideas . . . and [the] protection of 
various intermediate associations—church, militia, and jury—designed to create an educated and 
virtuous electorate. The main thrust of the Bill was not to downplay organizational structure, but 
to deploy it . . . .”); Glendon & Yanes, supra note 198, at 544 (discussing the importance of 
intermediate associations to the Bill of Rights and labeling religious groups as “foremost among 
them”). 
 204. This depends, of course, on how one defines the enigmatic term “religion,” but most 
religious rights are exercised within the context of a religious community. See Roberts v. U.S. 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (“An individual’s freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the 
government . . . could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State [if] a correlative 
freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed.”); cf. STANLEY 
HAUERWAS, THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM: A PRIMER IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS 33 (1983) 
(emphasizing the communal texture of [Christian] faith).  As Hauerwas observes, “This is not to 
suggest that our actions, decisions and choices are unimportant, but rather that the church has a 
stake in holding together our being and behaving in such a manner that our doing only can be a 
reflection of our character.” Hauerwas, supra, at 33–34. Elsewhere, he notes that “the [Christian] 
church does not have a social ethic; the church is a social ethic.” Hauerwas, supra, at 99; 
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 23–24 (3d ed. 2007) 
(criticizing emotivism and utilitarianism’s individualistic ethical thrust, and emphasizing the 
importance of a common good for a community that wishes to maintain meaningful social 
relationships and discourses). But see Stephen Macedo, Hauerwas, Liberalism, and Public 
Reason: Terms of Engagement?, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 169–80 (2012) (critiquing 
Hauerwas’s political philosophy and theology, especially Hauerwas’s criticism of liberalism). 
 205. See Gedicks, supra note 200, at 106–07 (discussing the symbiotic relationship that 
emerges between individuals and groups in religious contexts). 
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to the foreground of a free-exercise analysis necessarily brings 
individual liberties to the foreground—to the detriment of religious 
institutions. 
B. Critique of Consent and Membership 
A shunning jurisprudence that employs consent and membership 
as its primary analytical tools will fail to adequately protect the 
organizational free-exercise rights of religious entities. As the 
foregoing review illustrates, membership and consent have been 
wielded enigmatically by courts. But certain trends can be deciphered 
from their deployment. 
First, some courts treat membership as a proxy for consent.206 If a 
member belongs to a religious group, then she is presumptively 
considered to have consented to its judicature. As soon as membership 
is withdrawn—by the congregation or the parishioner—consent is 
likewise withdrawn. Other courts find membership to be a proxy for a 
congregation’s disciplinary authority.207 If the shunned is a member of 
the congregation at any point in time, then that grants the church broad 
constitutional latitude to enact its discipline. Under this approach, a 
former member’s ongoing consent, or lack thereof, is largely 
immaterial. The relevant question is whether a parishioner originally 
consented to the church’s practices when joining.208 And even still, 
some courts do not assign membership dispositive weight at all.209 
Instead, they look to whether a parishioner manifested consent to the 
congregational discipline at the time of its enactment.210  
These nuances shed light on precisely what is so problematic about 
membership and consent as analytical touchstones. Courts do not 
ascribe the same meaning or significance to them, nor has the Supreme 
Court provided any guidance regarding how these categories should be 
deployed in religious-tort suits.211 Perhaps there is enough overlap to 
 
 206. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing Guinn’s treatment of membership 
and consent); see also Hadnot v. Shaw, 826 P.2d 978, 989–90, 989 n.53 (following Guinn in treating 
membership as a proxy for consent). 
 207. See, e.g., supra note 65–75 and accompanying text (noting that the court in Paul granted 
the congregation disciplinary latitude because Paul was a “former member”). 
 208. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 209. See infra notes 238–39 and accompanying text. 
 210. See infra notes 238–39 and accompanying text. 
 211. See Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 794 (Wis. 1995) 
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (remarking that “this area of First Amendment law is in flux and 
the United States Supreme Court cases offer very limited guidance”). 
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discern a “family resemblance” between the terms as they are applied 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.212 Membership might connote a sense 
of formal belongingness to an identifiable group, whereas consent 
might entail a parishioner’s willingness—whether as a member or 
not—to be subject to a church’s judicature. But because there has been 
careless deployment of consent and membership, their use in shunning 
jurisprudence is problematic. Both deserve discrete attention to tease 
out their deficiencies. 
1. Consent.  Although a consent theory is proper in several areas 
of tort law, it is inapposite when dealing with a shunning case for 
several reasons. To begin, a consent theory of constitutional protection 
fails to give adequate coverage to religious activities and thereby chills 
the free exercise of religion.213 Some commentators argue that this is a 
desirable outcome inasmuch as, with shunning, “the disgruntled former 
member with dubious-sounding claims of intangible emotional harm 
[often] confronts a unified church bureaucracy” with coercive power.214  
A consent theory for religious torts, however, ignores an 
important practical reality. Church members, with the luxury of a 
voluntary decision and the ability to appraise religious doctrine, are 
typically the parties best situated to avoid dignitary harm. They have 
notice at the outset about the potential consequences of church 
discipline and voluntarily assume the risk should they fail to abide by 
the religious group’s teachings.215 To be sure, as a social-psychological 
reality, this is not always the case (for example, in the case of children). 
The religious member often finds herself within a community in medias 
res, whether due to familial influence or whatever else might attract a 
member to a religious community.216 However, even in circumstances 
where the member does not possess notice ex ante, she generally 
 
 212. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 35–36 (G.E.M. 
Anscombe P.M.S. Hacker & Joachim Schulte trans., 4th ed., 2009) (employing the concept of 
family resemblance to discuss how language works across different social and institutional 
contexts). 
 213. Cf. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 345–46 (noting that prioritizing individual free-exercise rights over organizational 
rights carries “substantial potential for chilling religious activity”); Cupp, supra note 38, at 962 
(discussing the chilling effect of tort liability for churches, even for nontortious activity). 
 214. Miller, supra note 4, at 293. 
 215. Cf. supra notes 110–52 (discussing Penley). 
 216. See Cupp, supra note 38, at 979–80 (outlining circumstances in which voluntary consent 
to church membership might be equivocal). 
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becomes apprised of ecclesiastical practices with time,217 and the 
importance of preserving organizational free-exercise rights still favors 
the legal fiction of a contractual approach.218 
By giving precedence to the ongoing consent of individuals, 
religious organizations become subject to the individual’s First 
Amendment rights and hence less able to perform their corporate 
religious practices.219 Religious groups’ shunning practices are usually 
bound by inveterate doctrines, traditions, and texts; the practice of 
shunning in particular has been used by religious communities for 
millennia. So to find liability anytime one of those practices 
emotionally harms a plaintiff would necessarily vitiate the longstanding 
and entrenched rights of remaining congregants—and the entity 
itself—to freely exercise their religious beliefs. Simply put, if a religious 
group does not regain its disciplinary authority after the shunned 
member withdraws her consent, then it is restricted from exercising its 
embedded religious practices by the threat of tort liability.  
A consent theory also causes judicial analysis to hinge on 
incommensurable rights claims, wielding rights-based language to that 
end.220 This ultimately leads to impasse.221 Not only is this emphasis on 
 
 217. See id. at 980 (“Even if an individual’s religious membership was not originally voluntary, 
she is usually capable of affirming the church’s beliefs as an adult.”). 
 218. See, e.g., Murphy v. I.S.K.CON. of New England, 571 N.E.2d 340, 349–50 (Mass. 1991) 
(“The decision whether the free exercise clause bars a particular tort action is not necessarily 
determined by the presence of tortious activity but by other factors such as . . . the effect that 
liability for a successful claim would have on free exercise rights.” (emphasis added)). 
 219. Supra notes 198–206 and accompanying text. To be sure, this could be argued to be a 
desirable result on a philosophical, psychological, or sociological level. But such an institutional 
subversion does not comport with the utilitarian logic usually employed by judicial 
decisionmakers—for better or for worse. See H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through 
English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969, 986–89 (1977) (discussing 
the influence of utilitarianism on prominent jurists).  
 220. Although American jurisprudence is steeped in this practice, Alasdair MacIntyre artfully 
presents an alternative view of rights: 
From this it does not of course follow that there are no natural or human rights; it only 
follows that no one could have known that there were. And this at least raises certain 
questions. But we do not need to be distracted into answering them, for the truth is 
plain: there are no such rights, and belief in them is one with belief in witches and in 
unicorns. 
MACINTYRE, supra note 204, at 69. It is beyond the scope of this Note to address the issue of 
rights or rights-based language at length. It is mentioned here merely to show that arguments that 
depend upon such rights-based language—and indeed rights themselves—are contested 
philosophical categories. 
 221. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE 171–83 (1991) (arguing that rights-based language has caused political discourse to 
become anemic). 
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rights problematic in the way it arbitrarily weighs incompatible 
rights,222 but it also fails to account for how religious people think, 
speak, and act. Within Western jurisprudence, when one consents to 
something, one passively allows another to perform conduct that could 
potentially invade personal rights or interests, and agrees not to seek 
recourse if such an invasion occurs.223 The speech-acts performed 
within religious forms of life,224 on the other hand, more often connote 
a sense of positive duty than passive permission.225 Consent is 
allowance. It is negative and passive in tenor. Contract is covenant. It 
entails mutual, affirmative promises to act—or not act—in a specific 
way. This is often lost on jurists.  
Finally, within the consent paradigm, it is difficult to say what 
constitutes and effects ongoing consent—that is, what would be 
required for a person to manifest or withdraw his or her consent. These 
issues find expression in both Penley and Paul. In Penley, in light of 
Penley’s transitional relationship with Westbrook, it is difficult to 
determine what exactly she consented to at the outset.226 Of course she 
consented to church doctrine;227 but her already-established counseling 
relationship obscured her ex ante consent to the church’s disciplinary 
measures, made clear by her inability to foresee that her divulgence 
would lead to injury. Similarly, in Paul, the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints changed its shunning doctrine after Paul had already 
 
 222. See supra notes 204–05 and accompanying text. 
 223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“Consent is 
willingness in fact for conduct to occur. . . . ‘Consent’ is used throughout with reference to conduct 
on the part of the actor that is intended to invade the interests of the one who consents.”); id. § 
892A(5) cmt. i (“On termination of the consent it ordinarily ceases to be effective and the actor 
is no longer privileged to continue his conduct. There are, however, situations in which the 
consent has become irrevocable either by its terms or by separate contract.”).  
 224. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 212, at § 15 (providing examples of language games which 
differ according to the tacit backgrounds that he dubs “forms of life”).  
 225. Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s notion of freedom—that is, freedom for the other rather than 
freedom from the other—more accurately captures the communal nature of faith communities 
and highlights the affirmative duties that animate religious life:  
[F]reedom is not something persons have for themselves but something they have for 
others. . . . It is not a possession, a presence, or an object. . . . Rather, it is a relationship; 
otherwise, it is nothing. . . . Being free means “being free for the other” . . . . Only in 
relationship with the other am I free.  
DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, A TESTAMENT TO FREEDOM 106–07 (1995). A covenantal model more 
accurately reflects the ethos of religious persons than a consent model, the latter of which is based 
heavily upon liberalism’s commitment to freedom from the infringement of rights. For examples 
of these duties, see supra note 248 and accompanying text.  
 226. See supra notes 104–21 and accompanying text. 
 227. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
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failed to consent to it. It is therefore doubtful that her ex ante consent 
adequately encompassed the discipline enacted after the doctrinal 
change.228 
Consent is also problematic in jurisdictions that employ 
membership as a proxy for consent. In Hadnot, for example, the court 
held that “a member’s positive act at any time” is sufficient to sever 
consent, including words and conduct.229 Yet the court did not find 
constructive withdrawal, even though the parishioners in Hadnot 
refused to show up to their own excommunication proceedings.230 And 
Guinn further complicates consent by holding that membership 
withdrawal—and thus, withdrawal of consent—must be explicit and in 
writing.231 There is little basis for such wooden rules.  
Thus, consent perpetuates muddled inquiries with vexing 
definitional and line-drawing issues. It therefore should not be the 
operative framework for shunning cases.  
2. Membership.  Similar definitional and line-drawing issues arise 
in evaluating religious membership, even in cases where membership 
is decisive. In particular, definitional issues arise in determining what 
constitutes both the creation232 and rescission233 of membership. For 
this reason, analytical templates that treat membership as static, 
monolithic, or dispositive fail to provide adequate free-exercise 
 
 228. This is not to suggest that Paul should still have been able to recover; it is rather to note 
that consent is an imprecise analytical device. 
 229. Hadnot v. Shaw, 826 P.2d 978, 987 (Okla. 1992).  
 230. See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text. The sisters’ failure to show up was 
arguably sufficient to constitute their constructive withdrawal of membership. Furthermore, the 
libelous act of accusing the sisters of fornication allegedly occurred after excommunication 
proceedings had taken place. Hadnot, 826 P.2d at 980. 
 231. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 232. See Smith v. Calvary Christian Church, 614 N.W.2d 590, 594 n.8 (Mich. 2000) (discussing 
the difficulty in defining membership). For example, is a congregant a member when she 
participates in a church community for fifteen years but never formally becomes a member? Is a 
person who has multiple memberships bound by all of them? Does a nonparticipating adult who 
was baptized in a particular religious tradition as a baby possess membership? Queries in this vein 
tend to multiply when membership is central to a free-exercise analysis. 
 233. In Justice Wilson’s Guinn dissent, for instance, she observed that “the plaintiff had the 
right to terminate her membership within the church upon communication of that fact to an 
authorized representative of the church, at any time. The form of the communication is not limited 
to written or explicit resignation.” Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 791 
(Okla. 1989). This is clearly at odds with the majority’s insistence upon explicit written 
communication. So the majority and dissent disagreed about what effects membership 
withdrawal. 
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protection for religious institutions or individuals—especially when 
their membership is equivocal.234 
In reality, membership is often fluid, amorphous, and porous. A 
person might pass in and out of a congregation without either party 
clearly defining the scope of membership, but that person’s conduct 
might still expose her to church discipline. An instructive case on this 
point is Smith v. Calvary Christian.235 There, a parishioner withdrew his 
church membership but still returned to his former church to dispute 
religious doctrine with his former pastor during a congregational 
gathering.236 Although he had rescinded his membership, the church 
still enacted disciplinary measures against him, so he sued.237 The court 
found for the defendant church, however, holding that, contra Guinn, 
“church membership alone is not dispositive of whether the plaintiff 
consented to the church’s practices. . . . Indeed, many faiths do not 
include a concept of ‘membership’ at all.”238 Consequently, because the 
parishioner consented to church discipline before joining the church 
and by returning to the church after he withdrew membership, the 
court held that he could not recover in tort.239 Hence, on a practical 
level, membership fails to account for the realities of congregational 
participation. It is often messy and indeterminate. Therefore, it should 
not serve as the direct analytical touchstone of shunning cases, nor 
should it do so indirectly as a proxy for consent.  
The elusive nature of membership is further complicated when a 
religious body’s doctrine prohibits the withdrawal of membership, like 
the Collinsville Church in Guinn.240 Under those circumstances, a 
court’s definition of “membership,” however reasonable, is not a 
neutral articulation, but rather an affirmative definition with First 
Amendment implications. Indeed, by defining what constitutes 
“membership” against the express theological understanding of a 
church and then resolving to settle disputes on that basis, a court 
 
 234. See Cupp, supra note 38, at 978 (“Not recognizing the difference between equivocal and 
wholehearted membership may lead to harsh results, particularly in a society in which religious 
membership is often halfhearted or traditional.”). 
 235. Smith v. Calvary Christian, 614 N.W.2d 590 (Mich. 2000). 
 236. Id. at 591. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 594. 
 239. Id. at 595. 
 240. Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 776 (Okla. 1989) (“In defense of 
their actions the Elders claim that the Church of Christ has no doctrinal provision for withdrawal 
of membership. According to their beliefs, a member remains a part of the congregation for life.”).  
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effectively restricts a religious entity’s free-exercise rights of self-
definition.241 Thus, a protean category like membership status should 
not be dispositive for courts. 
C. Proposed Contractual Paradigm 
Most courts address the issues that are generated by religious-
discipline cases through a consent or membership paradigm.242 Yet this 
has led to a morass of analytical problems and inconsistencies, as 
outlined above. Numerous commentators have also suggested that 
courts should apply a definitional approach to religious-tort cases, 
which would be redolent of the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
defamation law.243 This approach advocates recovery for tort plaintiffs 
but tempers recovery based on the definition of what constitutes 
tortious conduct (for example, by requiring proof of malice, burden 
shifting, and damages limitations). Although this approach has some 
merit, a definitional balancing framework may also create further 
confusion and unpredictability, just as it has in the defamation 
context.244   
This Part therefore advocates a contract paradigm for shunning 
cases and a movement away from a consent theory or rigid membership 
analysis. This is not to suggest that consent or membership should be 
jettisoned or play only a peripheral role in shunning cases; rather, 
viewing them through a contractual lens is analytically crisper and 
better attuned to the diverse facts presented by shunning. A contract 
 
 241. See Gedicks, supra note 200, at 150 (discussing the negative free-exercise implications of 
government intervention in membership decisions). 
 242. See, e.g., Smith v. Calvary Christian Church, 614 N.W.2d 590, 595 (Mich. 2000) (holding 
that consent, instead of status, is the relevant consideration for deciding whether a plaintiff can 
bring an intentional-tort claim against a religious tortfeasor); cf. Hadnot v. Shaw, 826 P.2d 978, 
988–89 (Okla. 1992) (observing that “the church’s judicature rests solely on consent,” but 
highlighting the importance of membership status in determining consent). For a detailed analysis 
of the cases applying a consent theory, see Cupp, supra note 38, at 976–83. 
 243. See, e.g., Cupp, supra note 38 at 971–73 (suggesting a definitional approach); Wiesen, 
supra note 12, at 311–24 (same).  
 244. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 23 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“Since this Court first hinted that the First Amendment provides some manner of protection for 
statements of opinion, notwithstanding any common-law protection, courts and commentators 
have struggled with the contours of this protection and its relationship to other doctrines within 
our First Amendment jurisprudence.”); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age 
of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 961–63 (1987) (observing that, despite definitional balancing’s 
allure, it has a propensity to reintroduce the “bane of constitutional law—the judge’s personal 
preference”); Gedicks, supra note 200, at 148 (discussing the drawbacks of definitional balancing 
for religious groups and its tendency to reify an ad hoc balancing approach). 
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paradigm would narrow the factual inquiry and broaden the 
constitutional protection that would enable free-exercise values to 
thrive.245 It would therefore foster more cogent analysis and strike the 
appropriate balance between free-exercise interests. 
A contract framework was proposed in Justice Hodge’s dissent in 
Guinn: “Church membership is one of contract and when a person 
joins a church he/she covenants expressly or impliedly that in 
consideration of the benefits of the relationship he/she will submit to 
its control and be governed by its laws, usages and custom.”246 Under a 
contract paradigm, the individual submits her First Amendment rights 
to the authority of the religious entity when she joins the congregation, 
and those rights are subsumed under the church’s need to maintain its 
doctrine. A court need not inquire into the content of a parishioner’s 
contract with her church unless the contract raises issues of public 
concern.247 Instead, a court only needs to consider whether the contract 
was fraudulently or coercively induced at the outset, whether it was 
agreed to under incapacity, or whether the disciplinary practices 
instantiated go beyond the scope of the implied agreement.248 If so, 
then a plaintiff would be allowed to recover in tort. If not, then a church 
could exercise its legitimate disciplinary doctrine under the protection 
of the First Amendment, since the breaching party contracted away her 
right to recover in tort for the church’s exercise of its disciplinary 
doctrine.  
In this vein, a parallel can be drawn to free-speech challenges in 
which an individual contracted away their rights. In Snepp v. United 
States,249 for instance, the Supreme Court upheld a contract that 
“impose[d] a serious prior restraint on Snepp’s [free speech], and [was] 
of indefinite duration and scope.”250 Applying a contract theory, the 
court reasoned that, because Snepp voluntarily waived his First 
 
 245. As one shunning-law commentator aptly observed, “[t]he grand challenge is to develop 
legal standards that protect all but penalize none unduly on account of religious belief.” Hayden, 
supra note 12, at 607.  
 246. Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 795 (Hodges, J., dissenting). 
 247. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (explaining the health, safety, morals triad from 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). This factor would be akin to substantive 
unconscionability, where the church’s disciplinary doctrine so offends the health, safety, and 
morals of society that it cannot be deemed to be constitutionally protected. See supra note 34. 
 248. For a rich treatment of the application of these doctrines to the shunning context, see 
Cupp, supra note 38, at 979–83. Although Cupp does not advocate a contract framework, the 
presence of these factors would mean there was no initial consent. 
 249. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
 250. Id. at 520 n.9 (citation omitted). 
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Amendment rights as a condition precedent to his employment with 
the Government, his free-speech claim was barred even though Snepp 
was no longer an employee and the restrictions were indefinite.251 One 
famous commentator remarked of Snepp that “a right . . . can be sold 
and both parties to the bargain made better off.”252 In other words, 
Snepp waived his constitutional protections under the belief that he 
was better off with the contract than without it. Snepp therefore 
provides a lucid example of a person’s general ability to waive 
treasured constitutional rights under a contract and the persistence of 
that waiver even after a membership relationship and ex post consent 
have been severed.  
Similarly, a member of a religious congregation relinquishes her 
right—emerging both from tort law and from her own free-exercise 
interests—to recover for injuries occasioned by the church’s 
disciplinary procedures. In exchange, she receives a community of 
worship.253 Given this freely made, quasi-transactional relationship, it 
is unfruitful and unnecessary to engage in a competitive, zero-sum 
analysis of rights, as the Hadnot court did—pitting organizational and 
individual free-exercise interests against each other.  Consent still has 
some merit for analyzing shunning practices in establishing assent to 
the contract. But ongoing consent is deficient as a dispositive apparatus 
because it disregards the covenantal nature of the relationship between 
religious entities and their congregants.      
A contract paradigm also prevents membership from becoming an 
all-or-nothing analysis. The consent necessary to find membership 
should not be resolved formalistically, as the Guinn court attempted to 
do through its writing requirement.254 Instead, as Justice Wilson’s 
dissent argues, conduct and words should be sufficient to determine 
whether a congregant manifested adequate consent to church doctrine 
 
 251. Id. at 509 n.3 (“[H]e voluntarily signed the agreement that expressly obligated him to 
submit any proposed publication for prior review. He does not claim that he executed this 
agreement under duress.”). 
 252. Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the 
Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 347. 
 253. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 731 (1872) (“[W]hen [excised members] 
became members they did so upon the condition of continuing or not as they and their churches 
might determine, and they thereby submit to the ecclesiastical power and cannot now invoke the 
supervisory power of the civil tribunals.”).  
 254. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
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at the beginning of her participation in the community.255 This 
functionalist approach comports with the contract model—and it 
comports with good sense.256 Under this more functionalist framework, 
courts will be better equipped to consider the constitutional interests 
of all the parties involved, be they the religious entity or parishioner. 
And a plaintiff would not be barred from tort recovery solely because 
of her status as a former member.257 For example, a plaintiff might be 
able to recover from a fellow member if the defendant was not acting 
in a religious capacity258  or if the defendant extended religious 
discipline beyond the scope of the parties’ implied agreement.259  
By the same token, a former member might be barred from 
recovery even though she withdrew her membership or was never 
formally made a member.260 For example, the Hadnot parishioners 
would not have been considered members when they manifested 
withdrawal through their refusal to show up to their excommunication 
proceeding.261 Accordingly, they would not have consented to further 
church judicature. However, the church would have still been entitled 
to exercise whatever discipline was reasonably contemplated by the 
parties upon their joining the community, whether formally or 
informally. The contract framework, then, merely identifies the parties 
to the original agreement and examines what sort of doctrine the 
parishioner agreed to. In doing so, it accounts for the practical reality 
of a vast and diverse array of religious-group participation and leads to 
simpler legal analysis.262  
 In religious-membership contexts, the parishioner and religious 
group agree ex ante—whether through words or conduct—that they 
 
 255. Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 791 (Okla. 1989). This also 
represents the view of the Michigan Supreme Court. See supra notes 238–39 and accompanying 
text. 
 256. In contract law, a contract can be formed through mere conduct or words. A writing is 
not necessary to form a contract. 
 257. This framework is in tension with Penley and Paul in this sense. 
 258. This was the exact point of contention in Penley. See supra note 155 and accompanying 
text. 
 259. See, e.g., Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. 2008) 
(discussing the church members’ exorcism practices which, under a contract paradigm, would 
have likely exceeded the church’s implied agreement with parishioner).  
 260. This framework is in tension with Guinn and Hadnot in this sense. 
 261. See supra notes 163–64  and accompanying text.  
 262. See supra notes 235–39 and accompanying text; see generally CHRISTINE POHL, LIVING 
INTO COMMUNITY (2012) (emphasizing the importance of the religious group when considering 
a person’s commitment to membership, instead of the person’s individual preferences). 
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will affirmatively do certain things.263 They less often profess what they 
will allow to be done to them. This is perhaps best illustrated by the 
confirmation process in many religious traditions. A confirmation of 
membership is redolent of a contractual relationship, wherein the 
religious member and her religious group make affirmative covenants 
to each other to perform certain positive acts for and with each other.264 
According to a religion’s doctrine, the failure to execute some of the 
promises—that is, a breach of the covenant—may precipitate 
disciplinary consequences. Nevertheless, the consent the member gives 
is preliminary and finds expression through the performance of duties, 
as in a contract.  
Thus, although consent still may be an ingredient of free-exercise 
protection, ex ante contractual consent is more in line with the practice 
of most religious organizations and is therefore more apposite when 
evaluating the constitutional status of religious discipline. Courts 
would still need to establish whether ex ante consent was manifested. 
However, a contract paradigm would resolve the intermediate and ex 
post line-drawing problems, since courts would not have to arbitrarily 
determine the standard for effective withdrawal of consent or 
membership. Rather, by shifting the locus of the analysis to the front 
end,  courts could develop unified standards and principles that would 
more ably strike the balance between competing interests and honor 
organizational rights.  
 
 263. For example, a Christian church generally promises to administer sacraments and 
provide a community of worship. In turn, the member is expected to contribute to the church with 
her prayers, presence, gifts, and service. See supra note 223.  
 264. For example, the United Methodist Church has the following liturgical practice for 
welcoming members, expressed through call and response: 
Pastor: As members of this congregation, will you faithfully participate in its ministries 
by your prayers, your presence, your gifts, your service and your witness? 
New Member: I will.  
The pastor addresses the congregation: Members of the household of God, I commend 
these persons to your love and care. Do all in your power to increase their faith, confirm 
their hope, and perfect them in love.  
The congregation responds: . . . . As members together with you in the body of Christ 
and in this congregation of The United Methodist Church, we renew our covenant 
faithfully to participate in the ministries of the Church by our prayers, our 
presence, our gifts, our service, and our witness, that in everything God may be 
glorified. 
THE UNITED METHODIST HYMNAL 34, 38, 44 (1989). This highlights the affirmative duties 
incumbent upon parishioners and is representative of multiple religious communities.  
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CONCLUSION 
Penley and Hadnot’s legal analyses were checkered with moments 
of clarity, but they ultimately demonstrate that they belong to an 
inconsistent body of First Amendment law. As it stands, shunning 
jurisprudence misunderstands organizational religious exercise and is 
awash in analytical tools that shroud the dual concerns of the religion 
clauses. Indeed, shunning jurisprudence is awash in words. To fashion 
a more coherent jurisprudence, courts should adopt a contract 
paradigm. This would appropriately minimize the importance of 
ongoing consent and cause religious-group membership to be analyzed 
functionally according to the participation that manifests ex ante 
consent. A contractual approach would be simpler than the current 
analytical rubrics, but it would be just as protective of free-exercise 
values. It would be woolly enough to allow for this area of the law to 
be factually driven but wooden enough to offer uncompromised 
constitutional protection. 
 In the Bible, Adam and Eve were banished from the Garden of 
Eden after they ate the forbidden fruit. Because they broke their pact 
with God, they found themselves East of Eden, away from blissful 
communion. They were harmed, to be sure, but their injury was 
wrought by their own error, so they had no recourse to seek. Today, 
shunning plaintiffs similarly find themselves East of Eden—similarly 
injured, similarly isolated. Whether their injury was caused by their 
own vice or the vice of their religious communities, however, is not 
always clear. And when courts have tried to determine the merits of 
tort recovery, the devil has often been in the details—arbitrary details 
about consent and membership. Under the contract paradigm 
advanced here, some plaintiffs might deserve tort recovery, while 
others might have assumed the risk of their harm. But when a judge is 
deciding between the two, at least the devil wouldn’t be in the details; 
it would be in the contract. 
 
